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ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether foreign direct investment crowds in or 
crowds out domestic investment in the European Union.  We use the theoretical 
model developed by Agosin and Machado (2005) and apply the Arellano-Bond 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to capture macroeconomic externalities. 
Our data analysis covers 26 of the 27 EU countries (excluding Luxembourg) for the 
period 1990-2008. Our main conclusion is that FDI has no negative impact on 
domestic investment in the new EU member states over the longer run. By contrast, 
for the older EU14 member states we detect a significant crowding out effect of FDI 
on domestic investment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the theoretical level foreign direct investment (FDI) can be explained by a variety 
of models.  Similarly, the consequences of FDI can be examined using a variety of 
empirical methods. According to Rugman and Collinson (2006) multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) account for approximately 80% of FDI. In the literature it is 
generally agreed that the spread of business via FDI to other countries is beneficial 
for the supplier countries since FDI profits are either reinvested where appropriate to 
earn future higher returns or repatriated.  However, the impact of FDI on the 
recipient economy is much more controversial.  One reason is that the volume and 
type of FDI inflows strongly depends on how easily and productively the host 
country can absorb the flows. According to De Mello (1999), the ability to absorb is 
affected by a variety of factors such as the host country’s trade regime, legislation, 
political stability, payment constraints and the size of the domestic market.  
 
The European Union is an interesting case for examining the impact of FDI 
on domestic investment since it is a common market which seeks to guarantee the 
free movement of not only good goods and services but also of factors of production 
including capital and labour within the EU's 27 member states. Mišun and Tomšík 
(2002) note that FDI is generally considered to be one of the main contributors to the 
successful economic transformation and rapid economic growth in some of the 
Central and East European Countries (CEEC).  A growing number of international 
companies use FDI to enter Eastern Europe by either acquiring local firms or setting 
up joint ventures. At the prima facie level FDI appear to have played an important 
role in promoting the economic development of some of the new EU member states. 
 
While there is a large literature about FDI and its impact on economic growth 
and productivity of domestic firms, there are relatively few studies that concentrate 
on the issue of the impact of FDI on domestic investment. Most of the papers that 
have examined the impact of FDI are based on continents other than Europe.  Some 
studies do include some of EU15, that is, pre May 2004 countries in their sample and 
others provide an analysis of the impact of FDI on some of the new EU12, that is, 
post May 2004 member countries separately. These studies include, Apergis et al 
(2006), Mileva (2008), Mišun and Tomšík (2002), Titarenko (2005), Javorcik 
(2004). However, to date no one has measured impact of FDI on domestic 
investment in all European Union member states. 
 
In this paper, we utilize the investment model of Agosin and Mayer (2000) 
and empirical approach devised by Agosin and Machado (2005) to analyse the 
impact of FDI on the level of domestic investment in the EU. We do this by splitting 
the EU up into two groups the EU14 prior to May 2004 (excluding Luxembourg) and 
the EU12 made up of the new members that have joined post May 2004. The paper is 
structured as follows, section 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical 
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literature on the linkage between FDI and domestic investment. Section 3 describes 
the basic model used for the empirical estimations while section 4 covers the data 
and estimation methodology and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
 
On the theoretical front the literature on the linkage between FDI and domestic 
investment is ambiguous. According to Blomström and Kokko (1998), FDI may 
stimulate domestic investment if local firms emulate the new machinery and 
technology introduced by foreign firms.  Moreover, spillovers may take place when 
local firms hire workers trained by foreign affiliates to work with the new 
technologies in the long run.  Workers employed by foreign firms may with 
encourage domestic companies to invest in new technology to both compete the 
foreign FDI sand also perhaps to encourage the foreign multinational to buy inputs 
and other goods/services from local firms.  On the other hand, results obtained by 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) show little empirical support for the position that 
technology is transferred from multinationals to domestically owned firms in 
Venezuela.  Domestic investment can also be crowded out because new technologies 
brought into the country through FDI may accelerate technological obsolescence of 
traditional technologies used in developing countries as argued by Kim and Seo 
(2003).  
  
According to Blomström and Kokko (1998) another important channel 
appears to be that competition becomes stiffer when multinational corporations enter 
the host market. This forces local firms to use their resources more efficiently or 
search for more modern technologies. Smarzynska (2004) argues that spillovers from 
FDI exist when the entry or presence of multinational enterprises increases the 
productivity of domestic firms in the host country and the multinationals do not fully 
internalise the value of these benefits. While Mileva (2008) argues that FDI may also 
be accompanied by increase capital inflows such as foreign loans and portfolio 
investment which helps reduce domestic interest rates and increase the availability of 
credit to finance new domestic investment. On the other hand, she recognises that 
multinational enterprises may raise productivity to such an extent that local 
competitors cannot compete and have to leave the market so curtailing domestic 
investment. This is particularly the case when MNEs instead of looking for the local 
suppliers import necessary inputs or enter sectors previously dominated by local 
state-owned firms which tend to be less efficient than privately owned companies.  
This latter argument finds empirical support from De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) 
who show that import competition and FDI discouraged entry and motivated exit of 
local firms across Belgian manufacturing industries during the period 1990 -1995.   
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Noorzoy (1979) argues that domestic investment may be substituted by 
foreign firms if the latter have superior technological or managerial expertise, or tax 
benefits provided by the host country. If MNEs start supplying goods that already 
exist in the local market, local companies may go under as they are unable to to 
compete with MNEs that may also have the advantage of economies of scale. 
According to De Mello (1999) the impact of FDI to the recipient economy also 
depends on the extent of complementarity and substitution between domestic 
investment and FDI, MNEs can displace domestic producers or reduce their 
available investment opportunities so reducing domestic investment. The linkage 
effect in the host country is emphasised by Wang (2008) who argues that if MNEs 
bring new goods into the market then domestic investment will be enhanced because 
of the ecosystem that has to be created.  On the other hand, the strength of domestic 
enterprises is important as local companies can be easily pushed out of the market 
together with potential investment from those companies due to entry of a 
multinational enterprise (MNE). This problem can be particularly acute if backward 
linkages are disrupted in domestic manufacturing through the substitution of imports 
for domestic goods resulting in lower sales.   
 
Javorcik, (2004) argues that positive spillovers from FDI to domestic 
investment can also be realised through shared domestic and foreign ownership 
rather than fully owned foreign investments. The joint venture aspect of FDI means 
that foreign know how and technology can filter through to domestic firms in the 
host country improving their efficiency, profitability and with it domestic 
investment. At the empirical level, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that domestic 
plants in sectors with more foreign ownership were significantly less productive than 
those in sectors with a smaller foreign equity.  Their results suggest that recipient 
plants with less than 50 employees capture the productive advantages of foreign 
owners and become more productive and therefore tended to invest more.  They also 
argue that FDI can raise domestic investment via the human capital channel.  If FDI 
leads to the start up of new businesses in the host country, then employees after 
being trained and through the process of learning and doing can start their own 
business in the future.  As such, the FDI will have a significant lagged effect positive 
effect on domestic investment.  Similarly, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) argue 
that FDI leads to higher productivity, because MNEs tend to hire the best individuals 
and therefore implement a wage structure very favourable for people endowed with 
higher levels of human capital and entrepreneurial ability. Working for MNEs 
improves their experience and skill set and the level of income of talented people in 
the host country which can result in higher domestic investment in the future. Indeed, 
the well paid job in foreign entity acts as an intermediate position to setting up their 
own enterprise in the future.  
 
Of course, as argued by Agosin and Machado (2005) the magnitude of 
positive/negative spillovers from FDI on domestic investment will vary from country 
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to country, because of the differences in domestic policy, the types of FDI a country 
receives and the strength of local firms. According to Weeks (2001) study of Latin 
American countries, the structure of the economy and policies toward foreign 
investment predetermines whether the positive or the negative impact is dominant in 
different countries over the time. In particular, liberalization and the conduct of 
sound macroeconomic policies improve the likelihood of FDI crowding in domestic 
investment.  
 
Bosworth and Collins (1999) measured the effect of FDI, foreign loans and 
portfolio flows on domestic investment using a panel data set covering 58 
developing economies excluding European countries over a 17 years period.  In their 
study FDI appears to have a positive impact on domestic investment and the results 
suggest a near one-for-one relationship between the two. A study by Agosin and 
Mayer (2000) finds mixed empirical results, the authors detect a positive effect of 
FDI in 15 out of 32 countries with a generally positive impact of FDI on domestic 
investment in Asia, a negative impact in Latin America and a negligible effect in 
Africa. As far as developing countries go Agosin and Machado (2005) assess the 
extent to which FDI in 36 developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America 
crowds in or crowds out domestic investment for the period 1971-2000. They find a 
clear crowding out effect in Latin America for the period 1971 – 2000 and also in 
Africa during the period 1991 – 2000 with complete long term crowding out in 9 out 
of 12 countries.  Liu et al. (2001) do not find any significant relationship between 
FDI and domestic investment in China.  While Ang (2009) finds that FDI has a 
positive effect on private domestic investment in Malaysia with a 1% increase in FDI 
inflows increases private domestic investment by 0.985%, keeping other explanatory 
variables fixed. 
 
Mileva (2008) presents evidence of small positive FDI spillovers on domestic 
investment over the long term in an EU group of transition countries with relatively 
well developed financial markets and stronger institutions, including countries 
included in our paper for the period 1995-2005. Ndikumana and Verick (2008) argue 
that a key economic development channel of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa is its effect 
on domestic investment. Their results suggest, first, that FDI crowds in domestic 
investment and, secondly, that private investment is a driver of FDI which implies 
that by improving the domestic business climate African countries can gain 
significantly from FDI.   
 
Apergis et al (2006) use a panel data set of 30 different countries in four 
continents for the period 1992-2002 and find crowding-in effect on domestic 
investment in the cases of Asia and Africa (less developed) and crowding-out effects 
for America and Europe (more developed).  They also provide evidence of two-way 
causal linkage between FDI and domestic investment. Their findings are partly 
consistent with that of Agosin, Mayer (2000), who detect similar results for Asia and 
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Latin America. Ghazali (2010), provides evidence that FDI supplements domestic 
investment and there is a bi-directional causality between FDI and domestic 
investment in Pakistan. On the other hand, using annual data for the period 1987-
2001 in both developing and developed countries Calderón et al (2004) show that 
both greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisition FDI tend to precede domestic 
investment, but not the reverse. Faeth (2006) also finds that FDI directly increases 
domestic investment in Australia using quarterly data for the period 1985Q3 to 
2002Q2. 
 
In an analysis of firm entry and exit in Belgian manufacturing industries, De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) find that FDI and import competition positively 
affects exit and negatively affects entry of domestic enterprises. Their results show 
that an increase in FDI of 10% causes the entry rate of domestic firms to fall by 7% 
in the long term.  Since entry into the market itself requires initial investments and 
staying in the market can lead to making an extra investment, their negative findings 
can be interpreted as a loss of potential domestic investment. According to Sauramo 
(2008), a crowding-out effect in developed countries can be attributed to evidence 
that outward FDI reduces domestic investment in Finland. The majority of the 
decline in the domestic investment rate in the corporate sector is explained by an 
increase of outward FDI flows since Finland has transformed its economy from a 
capital importing to a capital exporting one. Outward FDI directly reduces the 
financial resources that would otherwise be available for domestic investment. There 
is, of course, the possibility that other local firms operating in the country may use 
the investment opportunities that firms investing abroad ignore.  These ideas area 
supported by Feldstein (1994) who estimating that outward FDI reduces domestic 
investment on a one for one basis 15 out of 18 OECD countries. 
 
According to Cecchini and Lai-Tong (2008) increased productivity of 
domestic firms can cause an increase in domestic investment.  International openness 
generates beneficial effects on total factor productivity through the higher level of 
human capital and also via the transfer of technology in the Mediterrean countries. 
However, greater openness means the better possibilities to export your production 
to the external market. Many MNEs export their products before they grow to a level 
that they start investing in foreign countries.   
 
Mišun and Tomšík (2002) find that FDI increases domestic investment in 
export oriented countries by more than in domestic market oriented economies and 
they examine the effect of FDI on domestic investment in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland.  They find mixed evidence of a crowding out effect in Poland 
(1990 – 2000) and a crowding in effect in Hungary the same period and also in the 
case of the Czech Republic for the time period 1993-2000. The structure of foreign 
investment was assumed to be a substantial reason for the uneven impact. Mainly 
export-oriented foreign direct investment stimulated additional domestic investment 
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in Hungary. By contrast, domestic market oriented foreign investment meant stiffer 
competition for domestic producers and reduced investment opportunities for 
domestic investors in Poland. 
 
 In sum, the existing empirical literature suggests that the impact of FDI on 
Domestic Investment is complex and differing results can be obtained. Nonetheless, 
there is some evidence that FDI has a generally a positive effect on domestic 
investment in less developed countries and also some evidence of a crowding-out 
effect in developed economies. Since at the theoretical level FDI can have both 
positive and negative effects on domestic investment then the debate can only be 
settlement by resort to empirical methods. Different studies use different 
mathematical and econometric methods covering different countries and sample 
periods. The results of the existing literature vary depending upon the choice of 
country/countries, the time period considered and the specific features of the 
empirical model. 
 
 
3. A Model of the Linkage between Domestic Investment and FDI  
 
For our examination of the European Union, we follow the model Agosin and 
Machado (2005) which improves upon the model developed by Agosin and Mayer 
(2000) where the impact of FDI is examined on total domestic investment rather than 
separated out into public and private domestic investment. Our empirical objective is 
to analyse the dynamic relationship between total investment, foreign direct 
investment and growth of real gross domestic product with the main focus being to 
examine how the behaviour of a foreign direct investment is related to the behaviour 
of domestic investment in the long run.  
 
Total investment is equal to domestic investment plus inward foreign investment.  
 
It = Id,t + If,t                                                                                                                 (1)  
We assume that total investment (It) is made up of domestic (Id,t) and foreign 
investment (If) we assume that the latter depends on both contemporaneous FDI and 
its lagged values as set out in equation (2): 
 
If,t = Ψ0F t + Ψ1F t-1 + Ψ2F t-2                                                                                        (2) 
 
FDI itself is considered to be an exogenous variable because it depends on conditions 
in the world economy, MNEs strategies and so on. The basic model for domestic 
investment (Id,t) is the following: 
 
Id,t = λ(K*d,t - Kd,t)                                                                                                       (3) 
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where K*d,t represents capital stock desired by domestic firms and λ > 1 and Kd,t is 
the capital stock available to domestic firms at time t. 
 
The rationale underlying equation equation (3) is that: 
 
Kd,t* = φ0 + φ1Get + φ2yt                                                                                              (4)  
where φ1, φ2 > 0, Get  represents expected growth rate, yt represents the difference 
between actual income (Yt) and desired full employment income (Yn) and φ0 is the 
level of capital that is desired even if Get and yt are both equal to zero. 
  
K is positively related to λ since when K0 (actual capital) increases to K* (desired 
capital), λ0 (actual production) increases to λ* (desired production)., hence, actual 
production is positively related to actual capital since actual production will increase 
if actual capital increases.  
 
Kd,t = (1-d) Kd,t-1 + Id,t-1,                                                                                                                                                 (5)  
where d  is the annual rate of depreciation of the capital stock. 
 
Combining equations (4), (5) and (6) we obtain: 
 
Id,t = φ´0 + φ´1 Ge + φ´2 yt + λ Id,t-1 + λ´Id,t-2                                                                  (6) 
 
where: φ´0 = φ0 + λ2 (1-d)2 Kd,t-2 , φ´1 = λ φ1,  φ´2 = λ φ2  and λ´ = λ2 (1-d)  
If Kd,t = (1-d) Kd,t-1 + Id,t-1, then  Kd,t-1 = (1-d) Kd,t-2 + Id,t-2                                          (7) 
 
Finally, the model for domestic investment has to be converted into one for total 
investment with the foreign investment equation included. Replacing equations (6) 
and (2) into (1) and collecting terms yields: 
 
It = φ´0 + φ´1Get + φ´2yt + λ Id,t-1+ λ´ Id,t-2  + Ψ0F t + Ψ´1 F t-1 + Ψ ´2 F t-1+λ Id,t-1+λ´I d,t-2  
 (8) 
where:  Ψ ´1 = Ψ1 – λ and  Ψ ´2 = [Ψ2 - λ2 (1-d)] 
 
The final part is to specify a process for the expected growth rate for this purpose an 
adaptive expectations process is assumed: 
  
Get = η1Gt-1 + η2 Gt-2                                                                                                    (9) 
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The model is correctly specified only if foreign investment is not perfectly correlated 
with domestic investment. On a theoretical level both foreign and domestic 
investment equations are created using different components. While empirically, FDI 
has to be exogenous to the growth rate of GDP with 1 and 2 year lags since the latter 
are the variables that predetermine domestic investment. Hence, the estimated 
coefficients of Gi,t-1 and Gi,t-2 cannot be statistically significant in the following 
regression: 
 
F i,t = į´ + Ȗ´1Gi,t-1 + Ȗ´2Gi,t-2 + Ȗ´3F i,t-1 + Ȗ´4F i,t-2 + u´i,t                                              (10) 
 
The benchmark model derived from equation (8) is given by: 
 
Ii,t = α + ȕ1F i,t + ȕ2F i,t-1 + ȕ3F i,t-2 + ȕ4Ii,t-1 + ȕ5Ii,t-2 + ȕ6Gi,t-1 + ȕ7Gi,t-2 + ηt + İi,t       (11) 
 
Where α is a constant, I is the total investment/GDP ratio, F is the FDI/GDP ratio, G 
is the annual growth rate of GDP and the ηt are time dummies, ε is a serially 
uncorrelated random error. Gross fixed capital formation is used to measure total 
investment. 
 
The key objective of our paper is to test the long term crowding-in or crowding-out 
effect of FDI on domestic investment. The relevant long run coefficient is: 
 
  3   ^   ∑ βj 
^  j=1   βLT =       5   ^            1 - ∑ βj     j=4 
 
Our null hypothesis is that  βLT = 1. Using a non-linear post-estimation F-test we can 
obtain the value and significance of estimator of βLT, there are three possibilities:  
 
(i) It is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the estimator of βLT is equal 
to 1. In other words, an increase in FDI by one percentage point of GDP 
increases total investment by one additional percentage point of GDP.  This 
implies no crowding out effect on domestic investment.  
 
(ii) The null hypothesis is rejected and βLT > 1. Meaning that an increase in FDI 
by one percentage point of GDP increases total investment by more than one 
additional percentage point of GDP.  This case is considered as long-run 
crowding-in effect because total investment rises by more than foreign 
investment. 
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(iii) The null hypothesis that βLT = 1 is rejected and βLT  < 1.  An increase in FDI 
by one percentage point of GDP increases total investment by less than one 
additional percentage point of GDP.  Domestic investment is substituted by 
foreign investment and a long term crowding-out effect occurs.   
 
4. Empirical analysis of the impact of FDI on domestic investment within the 
European Union.  
 
 For the purposes of our analysis we split the European Union up into two groups the 
EU142 who were members of the European Union prior to May 2004 and the EU123 
represented by the 12 countries who joined the EU in May 2004 or later. We 
excluded Luxembourg due to its skewed data on foreign direct investment, in 
addition its estimates on foreign direct investment using different calculation method 
than the rest of the sample4. 
 
The model was run for EU14 and EU12 separately in order to compare the 
impact of FDI on domestic investment in old and new entrants to the EU post 2004. 
The data set is based on annual observations covering the period of 1990-2008.  The 
time period was limited to 19 years due to the political situation in Eastern Europe 
over the earlier years.  Many of new European Union members were under the 
political and economic control by former Soviet Union and data prior to 1990 and 
data is either incomplete or unreliable or both.  
 
The one-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) was used for estimation of the total investment function. 
When using GMM, the Sargan test is crucial to our empirical work because it shows 
whether instrumental variables (IV) are acceptable and valid, that is whether the 
instruments as a group are uncorrelated with the residuals. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would indicate that the instruments are not valid therefore estimates are 
not reliable. The advantages of GMM over IV are clear: if heteroskedasticity is 
present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV estimator, whereas 
if heteroskedasticity is not present, the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically 
than the IV estimator, see Baum et al (2002) 
 
 
Empirical results 
Table 1 reports results obtained by using the Arellano – Bond GMM one step system 
procedure. There are two conditions that have to be satisfied in order to interpret the 
results obtained from regression reported in Table 1.  The first is that the Sargan test 
cannot be rejected and the second is that AR(2) term has to indicate that the 
disturbances are serially uncorrelated, with both of these conditions satisfied  the 
regression suggests that the model is well specified.  
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Table 1: Investment equations for both samples using panel data for 1990-2008  
 
Ii,t = α + ȕ1F i,t + ȕ2F i,t-1 + ȕ3F i,t-2 + ȕ4Ii,t-1 + ȕ5Ii,t-2 + ȕ6Gi,t-1 + ȕ7Gi,t-2 + ηt + İi,t 
 
                                      EU-12                   EU-14      F                           0.10*              -0.04 
                            (0.06)              (0.11) 
 
F(-1)                     0.08                 0.00 
                            (0.23)               (0.97) 
 
F(-2)                    -0.07                 0.03 
                            (0.52)               (0.37) 
 
I(-1)                     0.75***             0.99*** 
                           (0.00)                (0.00)          
 
I(-2)                     0.07                  -0.03 
                           (0.45)                (0.71) 
 
G(-1)                   0.24***             0.17** 
(0.0)             (0.03) 
 
G(-2)                  -0.14***            0.01     
                           (0.01)                (0.86) 
   
F-test                   2.26*               12.4*** 
                           (0.08)                (0.00) 
 
Sargan Chi-Sq   163.44             154.8 
                           (0.17)               (0.53) 
 
AR (1)                 -2.67***         -3.31*** 
                           (0.01)               (0.00) 
 
AR (2)                  1.36                -1.09 
                           (0.17)               (0.27)                                                        
 
Notes: Estimation by one step Generalised Method of Moments, 
 p-values  in parantheses 
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent  level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent  level. 
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The results show that in the short run FDI has a positive effect on total investment 
for the EU12 new members but a negative and significant effect for the EU14 older 
member states. The results also show that there is a strong impact on total investment 
from the previous period’s investment and also from the previous period’s growth 
rate.  
Table 2 reports the results from the FDI equation (10) and reveal that there is 
not a problem of endogeneity between FDI and lagged growth for the period 1990-
2008 and the residuals are well behaved. There is, however a significant lagged 
effect of FDI on current FDI for both the new and older EU members. 
 
Table 2 FDI equations using panel data for 1990-2008 and for EU12 and EU14  
 
F i,t = į´ + Ȗ´1Gi,t-1 + Ȗ´2Gi,t-2 + Ȗ´3F i,t-1 + Ȗ´4F i,t-2 + u´i,t      
                                     EU-12             EU-14 
G(-1)                             0.01                  0.15 
                                     (0.88)               (0.27) 
 
G(-2)                            -0.08                  0.17 
                                     (0.20)               (0.17) 
 
F(-1)                              0.61**               0.71*** 
                                     (0.02)               (0.01) 
 
F(-2)                              0.10                  0.23 
                                     (0.77)               (0.46) 
 
F-test                            4.15**              13.76*** 
                                                              (0.00) 
 
Sargan Chi-Sq            66.78                 45.23 
                                     (0.29)               (0.94) 
 
AR (1)                          -2.14**              -1.75* 
                                     (0.03)               (0.08) 
 
AR (2)                           0.65                  1.58 
                                     (0.51)               (0.11) 
 
Notes: Estimation by one step Generalised Method of Moments, 
 p-values  in parantheses 
 * Significant at the 10 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent  level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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In Table 3 we present the results concerning the long run relationship FDI and 
domestic investment calculated from Table 1 using the formula for the long term 
beta.  
 
Table 3: Long-term effect of FDI on domestic investment in European Union 
 
Time Period 1990-2008                    EU12                           EU14 
                                                            0.61*                            -0.26 
 
Notes  
Panel Data estimation 
*   Not significantly different from one 
 
The results reported in table 3 show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that FDI has 
no impact on domestic investment for the European Union 12 new members in the 
long run. By contrast, for the EU14 older member states, there is evidence that FDI 
actually lowers total domestic investment in the long run suggesting more than a 100 
per cent crowding out effect on domestic investment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study has investigated whether foreign direct investment crowds in or crowds 
out domestic investment in the case of the European Union.  Particular attention was 
paid to comparing the EU14 and the EU12 for the period 1990-2008. Our results for 
the EU14 differ from the results obtained Agosin and Machado (2005) who find that 
because of large standard errors it is hard to reject the null hypothesis of no crowding 
out effect. By contrast, in our study of the European Union the standard errors of 
current and lagged FDI are relatively small and we argue there is a complete 
crowding out of domestic investment in the case of the older EU member states. 
However, in the case of the new member states there is no evidence of significant 
crowding out effect of FDI on domestic investment and we are unable to reject the 
hypothesis that total investment increases by the full amount of FDI in the long run. 
 
The reported results in this paper suggest that short term impact of FDI was 
a significant boost to total investment for the EU12 and marginally negative for the 
EU14. The long term results are, much clearer, FDI has long-term, one-to-one, 
relationship with domestic investment in the EU12 and there is no evidence of 
crowding out effects of FDI in the case of the new EU member countries. By 
contrast, a crowding-out effect was captured for older EU14 member states, that is,  
FDI has negative spillovers on domestic enterprises leading to a complete crowding 
out of domestic investment opportunities in the EU14 member states. 
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Notes: 
 
1.
 Keith Pilbeam is Professor of International Economics at the City University 
London. Neringa Oboleviciute is a graduate student of City University London. We 
are grateful for the comments provided by two anonymous referees on an earlier 
version of this paper. Corresponding author: Keith Pilbeam, Department of 
Economics, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, 
k.s.pilbeam@city.ac.uk 
2
. The EU-14 are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
3
. The EU-12 are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.  
4.
 In the case of Luxembourg many purely financial transactions were included in foreign 
direct investment and made FDI/GDP to be larger than GFCF/GDP. 
 
 
Data Appendix 
 
The data on Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, Gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP,  the GDP growth rate employed in this paper was 
collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2009).  All series are 
in 2000 US dollars.  
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